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ABSTRACT
Deep neural networks have been shown to exhibit an intriguing vulnerability to adversarial input
images corrupted with imperceptible perturbations. However, the majority of adversarial attacks as-
sume global, fine-grained control over the image pixel space. In this paper, we consider a different
setting: what happens if the adversary could only alter specific attributes of the input image? These
would generate inputs that might be perceptibly different, but still natural-looking and enough to
fool a classifier. We propose a novel approach to generate such “semantic” adversarial examples
by optimizing a particular adversarial loss over the range-space of a parametric conditional gener-
ative model. We demonstrate implementations of our attacks on binary classifiers trained on face
images, and show that such natural-looking semantic adversarial examples exist. We evaluate the
effectiveness of our attack on synthetic and real data, and present detailed comparisons with existing
attack methods. We supplement our empirical results with theoretical bounds that demonstrate the
existence of such parametric adversarial examples.
1 Introduction
Figure 1: Examples of semantic adversarial attacks with a single modifiable attribute. The first and third columns are
original images. Semantic adversarial examples (Columns 2 and 4) are generated by optimizing over the manifold of
a parametric generative model to fool a binary gender classifier.
The existence of adversarial inputs for deep neural network-based classifiers has been well established by several recent
works [5, 10, 16, 17, 58, 41]. The adversary typically confounds the classifier by adding an imperceptible perturbation
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to a given input image, where the range of the perturbation is defined in terms of bounded pixel-space `p-norm balls.
Such adversarial “attacks” appear to catastrophically affect the performance of state-of-the-art classifiers [1, 22, 23,
54].
Pixel-space norm-constrained attacks reveal interesting insights about generalization properties of deep neural net-
works. However, imperceptible attacks are certainly not the only means available to an adversary. Consider an input
example that comprises salient, invariant features along with modifiable attributes. An example would be an image of
a face, which consists of invariant features relevant to the identity of the person, and variable attributes such as hair
color and presence/absence of eyeglasses. Such adversarial examples, though perceptually distinct from the original
input, appear natural and acceptable to an oracle or a human observer but would still be able to subvert the classifier.
Unfortunately, the large majority of adversarial attack methods do not port over to such natural settings.
A systematic study of such attacks is paramount in safety-critical applications that deploy neural classifiers, such as
face-recognition systems or vision modules of autonomous vehicles. These systems are required to be immune to
a limited amount of variability in input data, particularly when these variations are achieved through natural means.
Therefore, a method to generate adversarial examples using natural perturbations, such as facial attributes in the case
of face images, or different weather conditions for autonomous navigation systems, would shed further insights into
the real-world robustness of such systems. We refer to such perceptible attacks as “semantic” attacks.
This setting fundamentally differs from existing attack approaches and has been (largely) unexplored thus far. Seman-
tic attacks utilize nonlinear generative transformations of an input image instead of linear, additive techniques (such as
image blending). Such complicated generative transformations display higher degrees of nonlinearity in corresponding
attacks, the effects of which warrant further investigation. In addition, the role of the number of modifiable attributes
(parameters in the generative models) in the given input is also an important point of consideration.
Contributions: We propose and rigorously analyze a framework for generating adversarial examples for a deep neural
classifier by modifying semantic attributes.
We leverage generative models such as Fader Networks [30] that have semantically meaningful, tunable attributes
corresponding to parameters into a continuous bounded space that implicitly define the space of “natural” input data.
Our approach exploits this property by treating the range space of these attribute models as a manifold of semantic
transformations of an image.
We pose the search for adversarial examples on this semantic manifold as an optimization problem over the param-
eters conditioning the generative model. Using face image classification as a running test case, we train a variety of
parametric models (including Fader Networks and Attribute GANs), and demonstrate the ability to generate semanti-
cally meaningful adversarial examples using each of these models. In addition to our empirical evaluations, we also
provide a theoretical analysis of a simplified semantic attack model to understand the capacity of parametric attacks
that typically exploit a significantly lower dimensional attack space compared to the classical pixel-space attacks.
Our specific contributions are as follows:
1. We propose a novel optimization based framework to generate semantically valid adversarial examples using para-
metric generative transformations.
2. We explore realizations of our approach using variants of multi-attribute transformation models: Fader Net-
works [30] and Attribute GANs [20] to generate adversarial face images for a binary classifier trained on the CelebA
dataset [37]. Some of our modified multi-attribute models are non-trivial and may be of independent interest.
3. We present an empirical analysis of our approach and show that increasing the dimensionality of the attack space
results in more effective attacks. In addition, we investigate a sequence of increasingly nonlinear attacks, and demon-
strate that a higher degree of nonlinearity (surprisingly) leads to weaker attacks.
4. Finally, we provide a preliminary theoretical analysis by providing upper bounds for the classification error for
a simplified surrogate model under adversarial condition [52]. This analysis supports our empirical observations
regarding the dimensionality of the attack space.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of our attacks on simple deep classifiers trained over complex image datasets;
hence, our empirical comparisons are significantly more realistic than popular attack methods such as FGSM [16]
and PGD [29, 39] that primarily have focused on simpler datasets such as MNIST [32] and CIFAR. Our approach also
presents an interesting use-case for multi-attribute generative models which have been used solely as visualization
tools thus far.
Outline: We begin with a review of relevant literature in Section 2. We describe our proposed framework, Semantic
Adversarial Generation, in section 3. In Section 4 we describe two variants of our framework to show different meth-
ods of ensuring the semantic constraint. We provide empirical analysis of our work in Section 5. We further present
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Figure 2: An single-attribute Adversarial Fader Network. The semantic adversarial attack framework optimizes an
adversarial loss to generate an adversarial direction. Backpropagating the adversarial direction through the Fader
Network with respect to the attribute vector, a, ensures that the adversarial example is only generated for that specific
attribute. Here, the adversarial algorithm generates eyeglasses on a face of a Female by optimizing a, thus forcing the
gender classifier to misclassify the image as Male.
empirical analysis and theoretical qualification on the dimensionality of the parametric attack space in Section 6, and
conclude with possible extensions in Section 7.
2 Related Work
Due to space constraints coupled with the large amount of recent progress in the area of adversarial machine learning,
our discussion of related work is necessarily incomplete. We defer a more detailed discussion to the appendix.
Our focus is on white box, test-time attacks on deep classification systems; other families of attacks (such as backdoor
attacks, data poisoning schemes, and black-box attacks) are not directly relevant to our setting, and we do not discuss
those methods here.
Adversarial Attacks: Evidence that deep classifiers are susceptible to imperceptible adversarial examples can be
attributed to Szegedy et al. [58]. Goodfellow et al. [16] and Kurakin et al. [29] extend this line of work using the
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) and its iterative variants. Carlini and Wagner [5] devise state-of-the-art attacks
under various pixel-space lp norm-ball constraints by proposing multiple adversarial loss functions. Athalye et al. [1]
further analyze several defense approaches against pixel-space adversarial attacks, and demonstrate that most existing
defenses can be surpassed by approximating gradients over defensively trained models.
Such attacks perturb the pixel-space under an imperceptibility constraint. On the contrary, we approach the problem
of generating adversarial examples that have perceptible yet semantically valid modifications. Our method considers
a smaller ‘parametric’ space of modifiable attributes that have physical significance.
Parametric Adversarial Attacks: Parametric attacks are a recently introduced class of attacks in which the attack
space is defined by a set of parameters rather than the pixel space. Such approaches result in more “natural” adversarial
examples as they target the image formation process instead of the pixel space. Recent works by Athalye et al. [2]
and Liu et al. [35] use optimization over geometric surfaces in 3D space to create adversarial examples. Zhang et
al. [71] demonstrate the existence of adversarially designed textures that can camouflage vehicles. Zhao et al. [72]
generate adversarial examples by using the parametric input latent space of GANs[18]. Xiao et al. [65] employ spatial
transforms to perturb image geometry for creating adversarial examples. Sharif et al. [55] propose a generative model
to alter images of faces with eyeglasses in order to confound a face recognition classifier. Contrary to these methods,
we consider the inverse approach of using a pre-trained multi-attribute generative model to transform inputs over
multiple attributes for generating adversarial examples.
Song et al. [57] optimize over the latent space of a conditional GAN to generate unrestricted adversarial examples for
a gender classifier. While our approach is thematically similar, we fundamentally differ in the context of being able to
generate adversarial counterparts for given test samples while providing a finer degree of control using multi-attribute
generative models. We discuss relevant literature regarding such multi-attribute generative models below.
Attribute-Based Conditional Generative Models: Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN) [18] are a popular ap-
proach for the generation of samples from a real-world data distribution. Recent advancements [49, 36, 64, 6] in
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GANs allow for creation of high quality realistic images. Chen et al. [6] introduce the concept of a attribute learning
generative model where visual features are parametrized by an input vector.
Perarnaue et al. [48] use a Conditional Generative Adversarial Network [40] and an encoder to learn the attribute
invariant latent representation for attribute editing. Fader Networks [30] improve upon this using an auto-encoder with
a latent discriminator. He et al. [20] argue that such an attribute invariant constraint is too constrictive and replace
it an attribute classification constraint and a reconstruction loss instead to alter only the desired attributes preserv-
ing attribute-excluding features. These models are primarily used for generation of a large variety of facial images.
We provide a secondary (and perhaps practical) use case for such attribute models in the context of understanding
generalization properties of neural networks.
3 Semantic Attacks
Conceptually, producing an adversarial semantic (“natural”) perturbation of a given input depends on two algorithmic
components: (i) the ability to navigate the manifold of parametric transformations of an input image, and (ii) the ability
to perform optimization over this manifold that maximizes the classification loss with respect to a given target model.
We describe each component in detail below.
Notation: We assume a white-box threat model, where the adversary has access to a target model f(x) : Rd → {0, 1}c
and the gradients associated with it. The model classifies an input image, x into one of c classes, represented by a one-
hot output label, y. In this paper, we focus on binary classification models (c = 2) while noting that our framework
transparently extends to multi-class models. Let G(x,a) : Rd × Rk → Rd denote parametric transformations,
conditioned on a parameter vector, a. Here, each element of a (say, ai) is a real number that corresponds to a specific
semantic attribute. For example, a0 may correspond to facial hair, with a value of zero (or negative) denoting absence
and a positive value denoting presence of hair on a given face example. We define a semantic adversarial attack as the
deliberate process of transforming an input image, x via a parametric model to produce a new example x˜ = G(x,a)
such that f(x˜) 6= f(x).
3.1 Parametric Transformation Models
First, let us consider the problem of generating semantic transformations of a given input example. In order to create
semantically transformed examples, the defined parametric generative model G(.) should satisfy two properties: G(.)
should reconstruct the invariant data in an image, and G(.) should be able to independently perturb the semantic
attributes while minimally changing the invariant data.
The parametric transformation model therefore, is trained to reconstruct the original example while disentangling
the semantic attributes. This involves conditioning the generative model on a set of parameters corresponding to the
modifiable attributes. The semantic parameter vector consists of these parameters and is input to the parametric model
to control the expression of semantic attributes.
We argue that the range-space of such a model approximates the manifold of the semantic transformations of input
images. Therefore, the transformation model can be used a projection operator to ensure that a solution to an opti-
mization problem will lie in the set of semantic transformations of an input image. We also observe that the semantic
parameter vectors will be much lower in dimension than the original image.
In this paper, we consider two variants of such conditional generative models: Fader Networks [30] and AttributeGANs
(AttGAN) [20].
3.2 Adversarial Parameter Optimization
The problem of generating a semantic adversarial example essentially can be thought of as finding the right set of
attributes that a classifier is adversarially susceptible to. In our approach, we model this as an optimization problem
over the semantic parameters.
The generation of adversarial examples is generally modelled as an optimization problem that can be broken down into
two sub problems: (1) Optimization of an adversarial loss over the target network to find the direction of an adversarial
perturbation. (2) Projection of the adversarial vector on the viable solution-space.
In the first step, we optimize over an adversarial loss, Ladv. We model the second step as a projection of the adversarial
vector onto the range space of a parametric transformation model. This is achieved by cascading the output of the
transformation function to the input of our target network. The optimization problem can then be solved by back-
propagating over both the network and the transform. We also modify the Carlini-Wagner untargeted adversarial
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Algorithm 1 Adversarial Parameter Optimization
Require: x0:Input image, a0:Initial attribute vector, E(.): Attribute encoder, G(., .):Pre-trained parametric transformation model,
f(.): Target classifier, y : Original label
1: h0 ← f(x), ladv ←∞, i← 0
2: success = 0
3: while do ladv 6= 0 and i ≤ MaxIter
4: a¯← E(a)
5: hi ← f(G(xi, a¯i))
6: ladv ← Ladv(y, hi)
7: ai+1 ← BackProp {ai,∇ladv (f(G(xi, E(ai))))}
8: x˜← G(x, E(ai+1))
9: if f(x) 6= f(x˜) then
10: return success, x˜
11: end if
12: i← i+ 1
13: end while
loss [5] as shown in equation 1 to include our semantic constraint:
max
(
0,max
t6=i
(f(x˜)t)− f(x˜)i
)
(1)
s.t. x˜ = G(x,a)
where i is the original label index and t are the class label indices for any of the other classes.
In comparison to the grid search method presented in Zhao et al. [72] and Engstrom et al. [12], our optimization
algorithm scales better. In addition, we create semantic adversarial transformations with multiple attributes for a
specific input allowing for a fine-grained analysis of the generalization capacities of the target model.
4 Semantic Transformations
While our semantic attack framework is applicable to any parametric transformation model that enables gradient
computations, we instantiate it by constructing adversarial variants of two recently proposed generative models: Fader
networks [30] and AttributeGANs (AttGAN) [20].
4.1 Adversarial Fader Network
A Fader Network [30] is an encoder-decoder architecture trained to modify images with continuously parameterized
attributes. They achieve this by learning an invariance over the encoded latent representation while disentangling
the semantic information of the images and attributes. The invariance of the attributes is learnt by an adversarial
training step in the latent space with the help of a latent discriminator which is trained to identify correct attributes
corresponding to each training sample.
Using our framework, we can adapt any pre-trained Fader Network to model the manifold of semantic perturbations
of a given input. We note that minor adjustments are needed in our setting, since the parameter vector required by the
approach of [30] requires each scalar attribute, ai, to be represented by a tuple, (1−ai, ai). Since there is a one-to-one
mapping between the two representations, we can project any real-valued parameter vector a into this tuple form via
an additional, fixed affine transformation layer. Given this extra “attribute encoding” step, all gradient computations
proceed as before. We quantitatively study the effect of allowing the attacker access to single or multiple semantic
attributes. In particular, we construct three approaches for generating semantic adversarial examples: (i) A single
attribute Fader Network; (ii) A multi-attribute Fader Network; and (iii) A cascaded sequence of single attribute Fader
Networks.
Single Attribute Attack: For the single attribute attack, we use the range-space of a pre-trained, single attribute
Fader Network to constrain our adversarial attack. The single attribute attack constrains an attacker to only modify
a specified attribute for all the images. In the case of face images, such attributes might include presence/absence of
eyeglasses, hair color, and nose shape.
In our experiments, we present examples of attacks on a gender classifier using three separate single attributes: eye-
glasses, age, and skin complexion. Figure 2 describes the mechanism of a single-attribute adversarial Fader Network
that generates an adversarial example by adding eyeglasses.
5
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
Figure 3: Semantic adversarial examples generated with multiple attribute semantic models as in table 1. Columns
(a), (e) and (g) are original images. Columns (b){Attribute category: A1,A5,A6} (c){Attribute category: A1,A2,A7}
and (d){Attribute category: A2,A5,A6} show examples generated using multi-attribute Fader Networks as semantic
transforms. Examples in (f){Attribute category: A1-A2-A3} were generated using cascaded single attribute Fader
Network. Columns (h){Attribute category: A1,A2,A6,A8,A10} and (i){Attribute category: A1,A2,A6,A8,A9,A10}
are images transformed using an AttGAN with 5 and 6 attributes respectively. Additional results of semantic attacks
on multi-class classifiers for traffic scenes are provided in the appendix.
Multi-Attribute Attack: Similar to the single-attribute case, we may also use pre-trained multi-attribute Fader Net-
works to model cases where the adversary has access to multiple modifiable traits.
A limitation of multi-attribute Fader Networks lies in the difficulty of their training. This is because a Fader Network is
required to learn disentangled representations of the attributes while in practice, semantic attributes cannot be perfectly
decoupled. We resolve this using a novel conditional generative model described as follows.
Cascaded Attribute Attack: We propose a novel method to simulate multi-attribute attacks by stage-wise concatena-
tion pre-trained single attribute Fader networks. The benefit is that the computational burden of learning disentangled
representations is now removed.
Each single-attribute model exposes a attribute latent vector. During execution of Alg. 1 we jointly optimize over all
the attribute vectors. The optimal adversarial vector is then segmented into corresponding attributes for each Fader
Network to generate an adversarial example.
4.2 Adversarial AttGAN
A second encoder-decoder architecture [20], known as AttGAN, achieves a similar goal as Fader Networks of editing
attributes by manipulating the encoded latent representation; however, AttGAN disentangles the semantic attributes
from the underlying invariances of the data by considering both the original and the flipped labels while training. This
is achieved by training a latent discriminator and classifier pair to classify both the original and the transformed image
to ensure invariance.
In order to generate semantic adversarial examples using AttGAN, we use a pretrained generator conditioned on 13
attributes. The attribute vector in this case, is encoded to be a perturbation of the original sequence of attributes for the
image. We consider the two sets of attributes listed in Table 1 to generate adversarial examples. In our experience, the
AttGAN architecture provides a more stable reconstruction, thus allowing for more modifiable parameters.
5 Experimental Results
We showcase our semantic adversarial attack framework using a binary (gender) classifier as the target model trained
on the CelebA dataset [37]. While we restrict ourselves to results on binary classifers on faces in this paper, additional
results with multi-class classifiers on the Berkeley Deep Drive dataset [69] can be found in the appendix (refer Fig.
8). All experiments were performed on a single workstation equipped with an NVidia Titan Xp GPU in PyTorch [47]
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Attack Type Attributes Accuracy of target model (%) Random Sampling (%)
Single Attribute Attack
A1 52.0 89.00
A2 35.0 96.00
A3 14.0 90.00
Multi Attribute Attack
A1,A5,A6 3.00 89.00
A2,A5,A6 1.00 81.00
A1,A2,A7 3.00 87.00
Cascaded Multi Attribute Attack A1-A2-A3 18.00 55.6A2-A3-A4 20.00 93.00
Multi Attribute AttGAN Attack A1,A2,A6,A8,A10 70.40 32.80A1,A2,A6,A8,A9,A10 39.40 40.40
Table 1: Performance of the Semantic Adversarial Example under multiple implementations. Legend for attributes:
A1-Eyeglasses, A2-Age, A3-Nose shape, A4-Eye shape, A5-Chubbiness, A6-Pale Skin, A7-Smiling, A8-Mustache,
A9-Eyebrows, A10-Hair color. As the number of attributes increase, semantic attacks are more effective. Our
optimization-based attack fares better as compared to worst-of-10 random sampling [12], showing the former’s ef-
ficacy at finding semantic adversarial examples.
v1.0.0.2 We train the classifier using the ADAM optimizer [26] over the categorical cross-entropy loss.The training
data is augmented with random horizontal flipping to ensure that the classifier does not overfit. The target model
achieves a (standard) accuracy of 99.7% on the test set (10% of the dataset).
Our goal is to break this classifier model using semantic attacks. To do so, we use a subset of 500 randomly selected
images from the test set. Each image is transformed by our algorithm using the various parametric transformation
families described in Section 4. Our metric of comparison for all adversarial attacks is the target model accuracy on
the generated adversarial test set.
Adversarial Fader Networks: We consider the three approaches documented in section 4.1. For every image in our
original test set, we generate adversarial examples by optimizing the adversarial loss in equation 1 with respect to the
corresponding attribute parameters.
In the cases of single-attribute and cascaded sequential attacks, we use the pre-trained single-attribute models provided
by Lample et al. [30] to represent the manifold of semantic transformations. For the multi-attribute attack, we train 3
multi-attribute Fader Networks with the attributes presented in Table 1. We create an adversarial test set for each our
approaches as described in Section 4.1 using our algorithm as defined in Algorithm 1.
Our experiments show that Adversarial Fader Networks successfully generate examples that confound the binary clas-
sifier in all cases; see Table 1. Visual adversarial examples are displayed in Figure 1 and Figure 3. We also observe that
multi-attribute attacks outperform single-attribute attacks, which conforms with intuition; a more systematic analysis
of the effect of the number of semantic attributes on attack performance is provided below in Section 6.
Adversarial AttGAN: We perform a similar set of experiments using the multi-attribute AttGAN implementation
of He et al.[20]. We record the performance over two experiments: one using 5 attributes, and the second using
6 attributes, as seen in Table 1. We observe a significant improvement in performance as the number of semantic
attributes increases (in particular, adding the eyebrows attribute results in nearly a 30% drop in model accuracy).
Comparison with parameter-space sampling: We compare our method with a previously-proposed approach that
investigates parametric attacks et al. [12]. They propose picking s random samples from the parameter space and
choose the adversarial example generated by the sample giving the worst cross entropy loss (we use s = 10).
We showcase the results in Table 1, and observe that in all cases (but one), our semantic adversarial attack algorithm
outperforms random sampling. In addition, the table also reveals that random examples in the range of Fader Networks
or AttGANs are mostly classified correctly. This suggests that the target model is generally invariant to the low
reconstruction error incurred by the parametric transformation models3.
Comparison with pixel-space attacks: In addition to our analyses described above, we also compare our attacks
with the state-of-the-art Carlini-Wagner(CW) l∞-attack [5] as well as several other attack techniques [16, 29, 12] in
Table 2. To ensure fair comparison, we consider the maximum l∞ distance over our multi-attribute attacks as the bound
parameter  for all pixel-norm based attacks. From the table, we observe that the CW attack is extremely effective; on
the other hand, our semantic attacks are able to outperform other methods such as FGSM [17] and PGD [39].
2Code and models: https://github.com/ameya005/Semantic_Adversarial_Attacks
3We do not compare our work with other approaches such as the Differentiable Renderer [35] and 3D adversarial attacks [70],
since these papers expect oracle access to a 3D rendering environment. We also do not compare with Song et al.[57] since they
generate adversarial examples from scratch, whereas our attack targets specific inputs.
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Attack ( = 1.74) Accuracy(%)
Single Att. Semantic Attack 14.01
Multi Att. Semantic Attack 1.00
FGSM [16] 91.6
PGD [39, 29] 26.2
CW-l∞ [5] 0.00
Spatial [12] 41.00
Table 2: Comparison of adversarial attacks with other at-
tack strategies. A lower target accuracy corresponds to a
better attack. The pixel space attacks are allowed to gener-
ate adversarial examples under the l∞ distance correspond-
ing to our best performing multi-attribute attack model.
Observe that semantic attacks are comparable to the state
of the art pixel-space attack.
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forms to generate adversarial examples, note that the tar-
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PGD) is more effective than multiplicative attack(similar
to our approach) over all values of k.
We also compare our approach to Spatial Attacks of [12], which uses a grid search over affine transformations of
an input to generate adversarial examples; `∞ constraints do not apply here, and instead we use default parameters
provided in [12]. Our proposed attack methods are considerably more successful. We provide additional detailed
experiments on binary and multi-class classifiers for other attributes as well as other datasets in the appendix.
6 Analysis: Impact of Dimensionality
From our experiments, we observe that limiting the adversary to a low-dimensional, semantic parametric transforma-
tion of the input leads to less-effective attacks than pixel-space attacks (at least when the same loss is optimized).
Moreover, single-attribute semantic attacks are more powerful than multi-attribute attacks. This observation makes
intuitive sense: the dimension of the manifold of perturbed inputs effectively represents the capacity of the adversary,
and hence a greater number of degrees of freedom in the perturbation should result in more effective attacks. In pixel-
space attacks, the adversary is free to search over a high-dimensional `p-ball centered around the input example, which
is perhaps why `p-norm attacks are so hard to defend against [1].
In this section, we provide experimental and theoretical analysis that precisely exposes the impact of the dimensionality
of the attribute parameters. While our analysis is stylized and not directly applicable to deep neural classifiers, it
constitutes a systematic first attempt towards upper bounds on what a semantically constrained adversary can possibly
hope to achieve.
6.1 Synthetic Experiments
We propose and analyze the following synthetic setup which enables explicit control over the dimension of the seman-
tic perturbations.
Data: We construct a dataset of n = 500 samples from a mixture of Gaussians (MoG) with 10 components (denoted
by Pd) defined over (x, y) ∈ Rd × {±1}. Each data sample is obtained by uniformly sampling one of the mixture
component means, and then adding random Gaussian noise with standard deviation σ ≤ √d. The component means
are chosen as 10 randomly selected images (1 for each digit) from the MNIST dataset [32] rescaled to 10 × 10 (i.e.,
the ambient dimension is d = 100).
Target Model: We artificially define two classes: the first class containing images generated from digits 0-4 and the
second class containing images from samples 5-9. We train a simple two-layer fully connected network, f(x) : Rd →
{±1} as the target model. The classifier is trained by optimizing cross-entropy using ADAM [26] for 50 epochs,
resulting in training accuracy of 100%, validation accuracy of 99.8%, and test accuracy of 99.6%.
Parametric Transformations: We consider a stylized transformation function, G(x, δ) : Rd × Rk → Rd. We study
the effect of varying k for two specific parametric transformation models.
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Figure 5: Semantically transformed single-attribute examples which are classified correctly by the target model but
show severe artifacts. This shows that neural networks are immune to significant changes in the semantic domain
unlike the pixel domain.
Subspace attacks: We first consider an additive (linear) attack model. Here, the manifold of semantic perturbations is
constrained to lie a k-dimensional subspace spanned by an arbitrary matrix U ∈ Rd×k, whose columns are assumed
to be orthonormal, and δ ∈ Rk
G(x, δ) := x˜ = x + UUT δ (2)
Neural attacks: Next, we consider a multiplicative attack model. Here the manifold of perturbations corresponds to a
rank-k transformation of the input.
G(x, δ) := x˜ = U.diag(δ).UTx (3)
Here, U and δ follow the definition presented earlier. This transformation can be interpreted as the action of a shallow
(two-layer) auto-encoder network with k hidden neurons with scalar activations parameterized by δ.
Nonlinear ReLU variants: We also consider each of the above two attacks in the rectified setting where the transfor-
mation is passed through a rectified linear unit: x˜ = ReLU (G(x, δ)) .
Results: We analyse the effect of the dimensionality of the attack space(k) by considering the performance of the
subspace and neural attacks on the target binary classifier. Figure 4 shows the comparison of the constrained attacks
for the linear and non-linear cases.
We infer the following: (i) as expected, increasing dimensionality of the semantic attack space leads to less accurate
target models; (ii) adding a non-linearity to the transformation function reduces the viability of both subspace- and
rank-constrained attacks; (iii) subspace-constrained attacks are more powerful than neural attacks. In general, the
degree of “nonlinearity” in the transformation model appears to be inversely proportional to the power of the corre-
sponding semantic attack. We believe this phenomenon is somewhat surprising, and defer further analysis to future
work.
6.2 Theory
In the case of subspace attacks, we explicitly derive upper bounds on the generalization behavior of target models.
Our derivation follows the recent approach of Schmidt et al. [52], who consider a simplified version of the data model
defined in Section 6.1 and bound the performance of a linear classifier in terms of its robust classification error.
Def. 6.1 (Robust Classification Error). Let Pd : Rd × {±1} → R be a distribution and let S be any set
containing x. Then the S-robust classification error of any classifier f : Rd → {±1} is defined as β =
P(x,y)∼Pd [∃x˜ ∈ S : f(x˜) 6= y].
Using this definition, we analyze the efficacy of subspace attacks on a simplified linear classifier trained using a
mixture of two spherical Gaussians. Consider a dataset with samples (x, y) ∈ Rd × {±1} sampled from a mixture of
two Gaussians with component means ±θ? and standard deviation σ ≤ √d. We assume a linear classifier fwˆ, defined
by the unit vector wˆ, as fwˆ(x) = sign(〈wˆ,x)〉.
Let S = {x˜ | x˜ = x + UUT δ, ||x − x˜||∞ ≤ }. Assuming that the target classifier is well-trained (i.e., wˆ is
sufficiently well-correlated with the true component mean θ?), we can upper bound the probability of error incurred
by the classifier when subjected to any subspace attack.
Theorem 1 (Robust classification error for subspace attacks). Let wˆ be such that 〈wˆ, θ?〉 ≥ k||U||∞,1||wˆTU||∞.
Then, the linear classifier fwˆ has a S-robust classification error upper bounded as:
β ≤ exp
(
−
(〈wˆ, θ?〉 − k||U||∞,1||wˆTU||∞)2
2σ2
)
(4)
The proof is deferred to the appendix, but we provide some intuition. Lemma 20 of [52] recovers a similar result, albeit
with the
√
k term in the exponent being replaced by
√
d. This is because they only consider bounded `∞-perturbations
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in pixel-space, and hence their bound on the robust classification error scales exponentially according to the ambient
dimension d, while our bound is expressed in terms of the number of semantic attributes k  d. A natural next step
would be to derive sample complexity bounds analogous to [52] but we do not pursue that direction here.
7 Discussion and Conclusions
We conclude with possible obstacles facing our approach and directions for future work. We have provided evidence
that there exist adversarial examples for a deep neural classifier that may be perceptible, yet are semantically meaning-
ful and hence difficult to detect. A key obstacle is that parameters associated with semantic attributes are often difficult
to decouple. This poses a practical challenge, as it is difficult to train a conditional generative model with independent
latent semantic dimensions. However, the success of recent efforts in this direction, including Fader Networks [30],
AttGans [20], and StarGANs [8] demonstrate promise of our approach: any newly developed conditional generative
models can be used to mount a semantic attack using our framework.
Despite the existence of semantic adversarial examples, we have found that enforcing semantic validity confounds the
adversary’s task, and that target models are generally able to classify a significant subset of the examples generated
under our semantic constraint. Figure 5 are examples of images generated with severe artifacts, yet that are successfully
classified. This presents the question: is “naturalness” a strong defense?
This intuition is the premise of a recent defense strategy called DefenseGAN [51]. Indeed, our approach can be viewed
as converse of this strategy: DefenseGAN uses the range-space of a generative model (specifically, a GAN) to defend
against pixel-space attacks, while conversely, we use the same principle to attack trained target models. A closer look
into the interplay between the two approaches is worthy of future study.
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A Related Work
Adversarial Examples and Attacks.
In 2014, Szegedy et al. [58] shows that deep neural networks had mainly two counter intuitive properties, stating that
the space described by higher layers of neural networks captures semantic information and there exists adversarial
examples which questioned the generalization ability of a neural network. They generate such adversarial examples
under the L2 distance constraint which look similar to the original images but are classified with a different label by
the classifier using a box constrained L-BFGS attack.
Goodfellow et. al [16] and Kurakin et al. [29] generate adversarial examples using Fast Gradient Sign method and
its iterative variant under the l∞ constraint in less computation time. Other methods similar to FGSM have been
mentioned in [60].
Papernot et al. [46] implements an attack under the l0 constraint where they modify the pixel having the most signifi-
cant contribution in changing the classification of the model to the target class. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [42] describe
an untargeted attack algorithm under the L2 constraint with the assumption that neural networks are linear in nature
which they further extend to non-linear neural networks. Another family of attacks relates to a single universal ad-
versarial direction for a dataset. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al. [41] prove the existence of an image-agnostic adversarial
perturbation. Fawzi et al. [15] extend this to theoretically show that every classifier is vulnerable to adversarial at-
tacks. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.further consider the effect of the curvature of the decision boundaries on the existence
of adversarial examples in [43].
Carlini and Wagner [5] propose three attacks for adversarial image generation and shows that defensive distillation is
not an effective defence mechanism. They devise attacks under the three norms in literature l1, l2 and l∞ to measure
the deviation of adversarial perturbation from the original sample over seven different surrogate loss functions and
finally selecting one of them which we use in our attack algorithm as well. The attack that they implement in this work
is proven to be the most effective attack in literature and is a benchmark for comparison.
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The primary difference between the aforementioned attacks and our attack is that these attacks perturb the image
and make imperceptible changes in the pixel space and thereby not modifying the image in a semantic way. On the
other hand, our attack focuses making naturalistic perceptible changes to the image which are semantic in nature and
realistic.
Parametric adversarial attacks.
The use of parametric transformations to generate adversarial examples has been tackled by several previous works.
Most of these parametric attacks target the image formation process to create adversarial example. A recent work by
Liu et al.perturbs geometrical surfaces or lighting by optimizing over the relevant parameters for a 3D environment.
They show convincing results with realistic looking adversarial examples. Zeng et al. [70] use FGSM to perturb 3D
models of objects to create adversarial examples. The primary caveat to such approaches is that they require precise
3D models of the objects that they create adversarial examples. Athalye et al. [2] demonstrate the creation of a real-
world adversarial 3D model using optimization over affine transformations corresponding to real-world realizations.
Eykhol et al. [13] also provide mechanisms for real-world realizable adversarial examples for stop signs using designed
adversarial stickers.
Mopuri et al. [44] train a generative adversarial network to generate adversarial attacks for classifiers. Zhao et al. [72]
show an interesting use of a GAN and an inverter network where they search over the input space of the GAN to
generate semantically valid adversarial examples. These approaches are morally similar to our approach though we
focus on specific physically perturbed attributes of images rather than imperceptible perturbations. CAMOU [71] is
a more recent work that learns a neural approximator for physical camouflage and then optimizes over the same to
generate an adversarial version to fool object detectors.
The space of generating adversarial examples using GANs for face recognition systems has also been touched upon by
Dabouei et al. [9] and Sharif et al. [55] which train generative networks for the specific purpose of creating adversarial
examples. Sharif et al.especially show a realizable attack by adding glasses using a generative network to fool a face
recognition classifier. We, in comparison, provide a more diverse attack space allowing for various semantic attributes.
In addition, since our attack involves physically realizable perceptible attributes, it can be used to characterize a
classifier’s performance against physical adversarial attacks as well.
Song et al. [57] uses an Auxiliary Class Generative Adversarial Network (AC-GAN) [45] to generate unrestricted
adversarial examples from noise and then optimizes over the latent space of the conditional GAN to find such adver-
sarial examples which get missclassified by a gender classifier. The paper describes the use of Mechanical Turk as a
checker for naturalness and validation for the generated images belonging to the desired class. We approach the more
complex problem of finding an adversarial transformation for an input image instead of generating a random semantic
adversarial example.
Attribute based generative models.
Our approach relies on the use of attribute based generative models for enforcing the semantic constraint and repre-
senting attributes as a real-valued semantic variable. we discuss a few relevant approaches published recently.
As mentioned in [20], the literature related to facial attribute editing can be broadly divided into two sections, op-
timization based approaches and learning based approaches. Optimization approaches include Li et al. [33] and
Gardneret al. [63] where the former optimizes the CNN feature difference between the input face image and the face
images with the desired attributes with respect to the input face while the latter optimizes the input face in order to
match the deep feature along the direction vector between the faces with and without the attributes.
Li et al. [34] describe a method to optimize over an adversarial attribute loss and a deep identity feature loss in order
to train a deep identity aware transfer model to add or remove facial attributes to/from a face. Shen et al. [56] learn the
difference between images before and after manipulation to simultaneously train two networks for respectively adding
and removing a specific attribute.
Generative Adversarial Networks(GAN) [18] are a popular approach for the generation of samples from a real-world
data distribution. Recent advancements [49, 36, 64, 6] in GANs allow for creation of high dimensional, high quality
realistic images. These have been incorporated into the several attribute swapping generative models. Zhou et al. [73]
recombine the information of the latent information of two images to swap a specific attribute between the given
images. Liu et al. [36] generate high quality images by coupling GANs in order to learn a shared latent representation
in order to tackle several unsupervised image translation tasks including domain adaptation and face image translation.
For multiple attribute swapping, models based on Kingma et al. [27], Goodfellow et al. [18],Larsen et al. [31], Mirza
et al. [40], Radford et al. [49] have become quite popular recently. Perarnaue et al. [48] uses a Conditional Generative
Adversarial Network [40] and encoder to learn the attribute invariant latent representation for attribute editing. Similar
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work has been seen in Fader Networks [30] where the model learns the attribute invariant latent space in order to
identify a face as one and the same with or without a specific attribute. On the other hand, AttGAN [20] argues
that such attribute invariant constraint is a bit too excessive and imposes an attribute classification constraint and
a reconstruction loss instead to alter only the desired attributes preserving attribute-excluding features. StarGAN
[8] uses a cyclic consistency loss to preserve information and instead of learning a latent representation, it trains a
conditional attribute transfer network to modify attributes. Chen et al. [6] and Odena et al. [45] map the generated
images back to the conditional signals with the help of an auxiliary classifier to learn this conditional generation of the
images. Kaneko et al. [24] uses a conditional filtered generative adversarial network to present a generative attribute
controller to edit attributes of an image while preserving the variations of an attribute.
Xiao et al. [68] swaps blocks of the latent distribution containing relevant attributes between a given pair of images.
A similar approach has been seen in Kimet al. [25] where the latent representation is divided in blocks corresponding
different attributes and these latent blocks are swapped in order to achieve multiple attribute swapping.
Data poisoning.
Much of the prior work mentioned discuss about adversarial attacks during inference. Data poisoning is a technique
where the adversary injects false data to hinder the generalization capability of a deep neural network. Koh et al. [28]
present the seminal work on data poisoning for deep neural networks where they construct approximate upper bounds
to provide certificates to a large class of attacks. Xiao et al. [67] and Xiao et al. [66] also present a similar approach
but on shallow learning models. Another class of data poisoning attack is referred to as a backdoor attack, where an
adversary corrupts the model to misclassify either a specific input or a group of inputs to a target label thus engineering
a backdoor that can be used to corrupt the learned model. Gu et al. [19] demonstrate a method to train a network
maliciously with good performance on training and validation datasets but persistent poor performance on inputs
associated with backdoor triggers.
These attacks can be realistic in nature, for e.g., a stop sign can be identified by the classifier as a speed limit sign in the
presence of backdoor triggers which are mainly special markers added to the inputs by the adversary. Turner et al. [62]
show that an adversary is able to gain whole control over the target model during inference, by training with samples
generated with a GAN. More recently Tran et al. [61] identify a property related to all backdoor attacks known as
spectral signatures with which poisoned examples from real image datasets can be detected and removed effectively.
Chen et al. [7] demonstrate an application of such backdoor attacks on a visual recognition system where they were
able to break a weak threat model with a limited number of poisoned data examples with semantic attribute changes.
This is perhaps the first attempt at considering the effect of semantic changes.
B Theoretical Results
Robust classification error for subspace attacks
We present a proof for the upper bound of the robust classification error in the case of subspace attacks. Recall the
data model we use; a Mixture of Gaussians data model, Pd(θ?, σ) ∼ Rd × ±1 with two components and σ ≤
√
d.
Each of the components are regarded as classes. We additionally assume a linear classifier, fw : Rd → {±1} defined
by the unit vector, wˆ = sgn(〈wˆ,x〉).
Let S = {x˜ | x˜ = x + UUT δ, ||x˜− x||∞ ≤ } and rank U = k.
Under the assumption that the linear classifier is well trained, i.e., wˆ is sufficiently correlated with the true component
mean, θ?, we upper bound the robust classification error. This involves considering the sample generalization error of
a linear classifier on Gaussian data. We adapt arguments from Schmidt et al. [52] for the case of subspace attacks. The
theorem statement is repeated here for convenience.
Theorem 1. Let wˆ be such that 〈wˆ, θ?〉 ≥ k||U ||∞,1||wˆTU||∞. Then, the linear classifier fwˆ has a S-robust
classification error upper bounded as:
β ≤ exp
(
−
(〈wˆ, θ?〉 − k||U ||∞,1||wˆTU||∞)2
2σ2
)
(5)
Proof. For proving the above statement, we consider the probability of adversarial misclassification under a rank
constrained attack.
Given (x, y) ∈ Rd×±1 where x ∼MoG(θ?, σ; σ ≤ √d, we consider a linear additive attack under a rank constraint,
x˜ = x + UUT δ (6)
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Here, U ∈Md,k is a random matrix with the columns forming an orthonormal basis of dimensionality k. In addition,
we consider that the adversarial example thus created is constrained to be in the norm ball, B∞, which implies that
||x˜− x||∞ ≤  (7)
We attempt to bound the probability that a rank constrained adversarial example, x˜, created using equation 6, exists
under the constraint defined by equation 7.
β∞ =P (∃x˜, x˜ ∈ B∞s.t. 〈yx˜, wˆ〉 ≤ 0)
=P(∃δ : ||UUT δ||∞ ≤ ,
〈
y(x + UUT δ), wˆ
〉 ≤ 0)
=P(〈yx, wˆ〉+ min
||UUT δ||∞≤
〈
yUUT δ, wˆ
〉 ≤ 0)
Let δ′ , UT δ.
Now,
β∞ = P
(
〈yx, wˆ〉+ min
||Uδ′||≤
〈yUδ′, wˆ〉 ≤ 0
)
(8)
Consider the domain of the minimization,
||Uδ′||∞ ≤ 
Now using the definition of the (1,∞) operator norm for rectangular matrices (See [3], Sec A.1.5) and the fact that U
is orthonormal,
||δ′||∞ ≤ ||δ′||1 = ||UTUδ′||1 ≤ ||UT ||1,∞||Uδ′||∞ ≤ ||U||∞,1
Let set A , {δ′ : ||δ′||∞ ≤ ||U||∞,1} and set B , {δ′ : ||Uδ′||∞ ≤ }. We can clearly see that B ⊆ A. Now
considering the f = 〈yUδ′, wˆ〉, as
min
A
f ≤ min
B
f
Thus we show that,
〈yx, wˆ〉+ min
A
f ≤ 〈yx, wˆ〉+ min
B
f (9)
From the above inequality, RHS ≤ 0 =⇒ LHS ≤ 0 but not vice versa.
By using the inclusion argument of probability measure, we can therefore show that,
P
(
〈yx, wˆ〉+ min
B
f ≤ 0
)
≤ P
(
〈yx, wˆ〉+ min
A
f ≤ 0
)
(10)
We now upper bound the RHS term using the same argument as that of Lemma 20 in [52].
P
(
〈yx, wˆ〉+ min
||δ′||∞≤||U||∞,1
〈yUδ′, wˆ〉 ≤ 0
)
=P
(
〈yx, wˆ〉+ min
||δ′||∞≤||U||∞,1
ywˆTUδ′ ≤ 0
)
Let w¯ , wˆTU
=P
(
〈yx, wˆ〉+ min
||δ′||∞≤||U||∞,1
yw¯δ′ ≤ 0
)
We now drop y as the constraint is symmetric and use definition of dual norm,
P (〈yx, wˆ〉 − ||U||∞,1||w¯||?∞ ≤ 0)
=P (〈yx, wˆ〉 ≤ ||U||∞,1||w¯||?∞)
=P (〈yx, wˆ〉 ≤ k||U||∞,1||w¯||∞)
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We now invoke Lemma 17 from [52] with µ = θ? and ρ = ||U||∞,1||w¯||∞ to bound the RHS,
β ≤ exp
(
−
(〈wˆ, θ?〉 − k||U||∞,1||wˆTU||∞)2
2σ2
)
(11)
C Details of Experiments
Dataset: For our experiments, we use the CelebA dataset [37]. The dataset has approximately 200k images of faces.
Each image is annotated with 65 binary attributes. Examples of these attributes are gender, age and skin complexion.
We preprocess the images by cropping the central 178 × 178 sub-image and resizing each crop to 256 × 256. The
resized images are then normalized to be between −1 and 1.
Target Binary Classifier: We attack a pre-trained gender binary classifier using our approach. The architecture used
for the classifier is shown in Table 3. We train the classifier with 70% of the CelebA dataset [37] as training data and
20% as validation data using categorical cross-entropy. We use ADAM [26] as our optimizer. Our model is 95.6%
accurate on the test set (10% of the dataset). We additionally train a binary age classifier with the same architecture.
Layers Size
Convolutional Layer with Relu 32x3x3
Maxpooling Layer 2x2
Convolutional Layer with Relu 64x3x3
Maxpooling Layer 2x2
Convolutional Layer with Relu 128x3x3
Maxpooling Layer 2x2
Fully Connected Layer 1024
Fully Connected Layer 2
Table 3: Architecture for the binary classifier.
Adversarial Fader Networks
Architecture of Fader Networks. Fader Networks are an encoder-decoder architecture that disentangles semantic
attributes during the reconstruction process. This is achieved by training a discriminator on the encoded latent vector
while simultaneously reconstructing the original image from the concatenated latent vector and the semantic attribute
vector. Figure 6 shows the architecture of the Fader Networks. An intriguing effect of the training process is that the
attribute vector space can be treated as a continuous and bounded space. We further can optimize over this space to
generate adversarial examples.
Single and Multi Attribute Attacks. We train three multi-attribute Fader networks with attributes presented in table 4.
The pre-trained Fader networks are used as semantic constraints with the attribute vectors as the optimization vari-
ables. We then process examples from the CelebA test set with the semantic attack algorithm to generate adversarial
examples. In order to make our optimization algorithm compatible with Fader Networks, we create a non-parametric
forward model to convert the attribute vector to a compatible form. We call this forward model “Attribute Encoding”.
We generate semantic adversarial images by optimizing over a modified Carlini-Wagner loss [5] with respect to the
attribute vectors using ADAM [26] with a learning rate of 0.01. We also experimented with various other optimizers
including stochastic gradient descent, RMSProp [21], but find that ADAM generates sharper images as well is the
most successful.
Our experiments show that successful multi-attribute models tend to be deeper and wider. In addition, these networks
are extremely susceptible to mode collapse unless the hyperparameters are carefully tuned. We hypothesize that this
is an effect of the strong coupling of facial attributes, thus making the generator-discriminator optimization difficult.
An unconditioned generative neural network generally learns to associate these entangled representations to a latent
vector space where dimension represents some combination of attributes. In order to get past this, we model the
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Figure 6: Architecture of Fader Networks. The encoder
converts the input image to a latent vector. The decoder
takes as input the latent and the attribute vectors to gen-
erate the transformed image. Here, the discriminative
classifier acts as an adversarial network to decouple the
underlying invariant data from the semantic attributes.
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Figure 7: Architecture of AttGAN Networks. As compared
to Fader Networks, the discriminator/classifier pair is used
to analyse the reconstruction of the image with the origi-
nal semantic attributes. Enforcing the decoder to construct
both the original and the semantically transformed image
results in the decoupling of the semantic and the invariant
data.
Attack Type Attributes Accuracy of target model (%) Random Sampling (%)
Single Attribute Attack
A1 70.0 87.0
A2 61.0 93.0
A3 48.0 88.0
Multi Attribute Attack
A1,A5,A6 12.0 86.0
A2,A5,A6 7.00 85.0
A1,A2,A7 28.0 84.0
Cascaded Multi Attribute Attack A1-A2-A3 30.0 68.0A1-A3-A4 31.0 80.0
A2-A3-A4 42.0 68.0
Table 4: Performance of the Semantic Adversarial Example under various Adversarial Fader Networks implementa-
tions for the binary age classifier. Legend for attributes: A1-Eyeglasses, A2-Gender, A3-Nose shape, A4-Eye shape,
A5-Chubbiness, A6-Pale Skin, A7-Smiling. Observe that as the number of perturbed attributes increase, the semantic
attacks become more effective. In comparison to worst-of-10 random sampling [12] of the attribute space, our op-
timization framework is more effective at finding semantic adversarial examples. Note that the performance of our
semantic attacks fare very well to decrease the accuracy of the age classifier as well like the gender classifier.
multi-attribute perturbation problem as a sequential perturbation of single attributes.
Cascaded Attribute Attack. For the cascaded attribute attack, we cascade several smaller single attribute models
one after the other to sequentially transform the input image. In this case, the problem of decoupling facial features
from the underlying invariant data is divided among multiple models. The transformed image is then input to the
target model. We generate adversarial examples as in the previous two cases for the CelebA test set by optimizing the
Carlini-Wagner loss. In this case, we also modify the attribute encoding module to treat each attribute tuple separately.
We find that the semantically transformed images tend to be less sharp as compared to the ones generated single
or multi-attribute attacks. This can be attributed to the concatenation of several reconstruction steps. Sequential
reconstruction leads to loss of information and the reconstruction error compounding.
Attribute Encoding. Each attribute is represented by a tuple of real numbers that sum up to one. These tuples are
concatenated into an attribute vector. To ensure that this structure is preserved over the optimization framework, we use
a non-parametric forward model to algebraically manipulate our optimization variables to this specific representation.
The encoding module also implements the box constraint for the optimized attribute values to lie between −3.0 and
3.0 in order to ensure that the generated images are valid.
Adversarial Attribute GANs
Architecture of Attribute GANs. Attribute GANs [20] improve upon Fader Networks by using a discriminator-
classifier pair to analyse the reconstructed images (Refer Figure 7 for the architecture). They optimize over a com-
17
bination of a reconstruction loss, an adversarial loss and an attribute constraint loss to ensure the editing of the exact
desired attribute while preserving the attribute excluding details at the same time. The encoded latent vector is condi-
tioned on the attribute vector during the decoding process. This results in the decoupling of semantic attributes from
the underlying identity data. AttGAN takes as input an image and an attribute vector where each element represents
an attribute. We select k attributes to perturb for our semantic attack.
We use a pretrained AttGAN model with 13 semantic attributes. For our experiments we consider 5 and 6 attributes
respectively for transforming input images.
Attacks. We adapt our adversarial Fader Network approach to the AttGANs by modifying the “Attribute Encoding”
module to mask attributes that we do not perturb. The encoding module also constrains the elements to lie between
−1.0 and 1.0 as required by our algorithm to generate valid images.
D Results
Our additional experiments on the binary age classifier show that our approach is able to generate adversarial examples
for other classifiers trained on the CelebA dataset (See Table 4). Note that our observations regarding the increasing
effectiveness of our attack approach as the number of attributes we perturb increase, holds even for a new classifier.
We also compare the performance of our attack with worst-of-10 random sampling (similar to the approach in [12].)
This proves that our approach is successful at generating semantic adversarial examples.
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
Figure 8: Semantic adversarial examples generated with multiple attribute implementation using Adversarial AttGAN.
The first, fourth and seventh columns contain the original images. We show adversarial examples generated under
the attributes: (b),(e) and (h) Eyeglasses-Mustache-Age-Pale Skin-Young-Black Hair and (c),(f) and (i)Eyeglasses-
Mustache-Pale skin-Age-Bushy eyebrows-Black hair. The quality of the images produced by the Adversarial AttGAN
are sharper than those produced by the Adversarial Fader Networks.
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
Figure 9: Semantic adversarial examples generated with multiple attribute implementation using Adversarial AttGAN.
The first, fourth and seventh columns contain the original images. We show adversarial examples generated under
the attributes: (b),(e) and (h) Eyeglasses-Mustache-Age-Pale Skin-Young-Black Hair and (c),(f) and (i)Eyeglasses-
Mustache-Pale skin-Age-Bushy eyebrows-Black hair. The quality of the images produced by the Adversarial AttGAN
are sharper than those produced by the Adversarial Fader Networks.
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Figure 10: Semantic adversarial examples generated with Single attribute implementation using Adversarial Fader
Networks. Columns (a),(c) and (e) contain the original images. We show adversarial examples generated under the
attributes: (b),(d) and (f) Eyeglasses, Nose shape and Age respectively.
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j)
Figure 11: Semantic adversarial examples for Multi-attribute and Cascaded Adversarial Fader network attacks.
Columns (a), (c), (e), (g), (i) are original images. Columns (b): Multi-attribute Eyeglasses,Age,Smile, (d): Multi-
attribute Pale Skin,Eyeglasses,Chubbiness, (f): Multi-attribute Age,Chubbiness,Pale Skin, (h): Cascaded Eyeglasses-
Age-Nose shape, (j): Cascaded Nose shape-Narrow Eyes-Age
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(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 12: Columns (a), (c), (e), (g) show original images and columns (b), (d), (f) and (h) show the corresponding
adversarial images produced by implementing the algorithm from Xiao et al.[65]. As can be clearly seen although
the adversarial examples are missclassified by the deep gender classifier, the produced adversarial images are not
semantically valid.
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Figure 13: Semantic adversarial examples produced by Attribute GAN trained on Time of Day labels from BDD
dataset[69]. Columns (a), (c), (e), (g) are original images. Rows (1) through (6) and columns (a) to (f) show adversarial
examples of cars getting miss-classified as traffic signs or trucks. Column (h) shows adversarial examples of traffic
signs being miss-classified as cars. Row 7, columns (b) and (f) shows examples as trucks getting miss-classified as
cars. Row 7, column d shows an adversarial example of a truck getting miss-classified as a traffic sign.
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